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10. The progress and degree of Agency-wide support and coordination of ARTICHOKET should be specifically reviewed.

11. Statistics compiled on Agency unlisted telephones and badges issued to representatives from other agencies indicate the need for stricter controls. There are presently 118 unlisted telephones in the Agency and 162 badges and limited passes issued to non-CIA employees.

12. In complicated security cases the Director of Security calls together a Panel consisting of representatives from the Personnel Office, Medical Office, and Security Office, whose task it is to consider pertinent non-security information on individuals seeking employment in CIA and arrive at a conclusion as to appropriate action to be taken. The findings of this Panel are authoritative.

13. During the seven years of its existence the Inspection Division has conducted numerous investigations important to the security of the Agency. It has conducted investigations in the United States and has participated in several inspections overseas. Much of this work has been done for the Director of Security under his immediate guidance.

14. The Physical Security Program of the Agency needs additional personnel to ensure desired standards and should be given more authority and responsibility to carry out its important tasks for the Agency.

15. In addition to the investigative activities the Special Security Division is responsible for conducting specialized support to world-wide operations, studying covert files which may reflect patterns of penetration into this Agency, and servicing from security points of view cover matters of interest to all offices and staffs. These functions are scattered throughout the Division. Administrative efficiency would be improved if they were consolidated.

16. The [redacted] Staff is performing a valuable service in an efficient manner on behalf of the operating components of the Agency.

17. The Career Service Board of the Security Office has accomplished good results on short-range planning for its personnel, but long-range career plans are lacking and the personnel generally have limited knowledge of Career Board activity. [redacted] investigators know of the existence of a Career Board but only a half dozen are aware of any career planning on their behalf.

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18. For security reasons the standard Personnel Evaluation Report is not

[redacted] in consequence a substitute performance statement is issued on professional agents and only on some of the clerical personnel. These reports are not adequate for evaluative purposes and should be discontinued.

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19. The policies and procedures governing the use of the technical interviews are soundly conceived and intelligently administered; personnel employed are well selected and efficiently trained.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

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1. The Director of Security should commend his personnel, including [redacted] for their excellence of performance, discipline under difficult circumstances, and devotion to duty. They should know also that the Security Office is effectively carrying out the Security programs and policies of the Agency.

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2. An accelerated program should be devised for completing the polygraph interviews of the [redacted] on-duty employees at Headquarters. This backlog of interviews should be completed by the end of October 1954. II-B-3

3. The Director of Security and appropriate representatives of DD/P should develop a mutually agreed to procedure on the handling of operational clearances and prepare a regulation binding on all components of the Clandestine Services and the Security Office.

4. Personnel in the Security Office duplicating the file and name check search activity of the Records Integration Division (RI) should be discontinued by the Security Office. In cases, however, where additional information is essential because of prior employment or sensitive information is required representatives of the Security Office should be permitted to obtain the appropriate files from RI as well as information from the files of the Area Divisions which may aid in conducting the investigation.

5. The Area Divisions in DD/P should be required to submit to the Security Office by 1 November 1954 the names of their covert operational employees and those engaging in proprietary operations not heretofore submitted so that proper investigations or clearances as appropriate can be made.

6. The Deputy Director (Administration) and the Director of Security in coordination with the Deputy Director (Plans) should study the problem of emergency destruction and make recommendations to the DCI as to where responsibilities lie and how a flexible emergency program on a world-wide scope can be developed and implemented.

7. The DD/A should personally review the status of the Agency's Safety Program, and take steps to insure that a program sufficient to meet the demands of the Agency is developed.

8. It is undesirable that CIA must depend on a guard force responsible to another agency with full Civil Service job protection. The DD/A and the Director of Security, in collaboration with General Counsel, should determine what administrative and legal problems must be overcome in order to develop a guard force trained and controlled by CIA.

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10. The Inspector General should conduct a specific review of the progress and degree of Agency-wide support and coordination of Project ARBICORNE.

11. The Director of Security should review critically the justification for each of the 118 Agency unlisted telephones and the 162 badges and limited passes issued to non-CIA employees and determine the appropriate action to be taken.

12. The Personnel-Medical-Security Panel which considers complicated security cases at the request of the Director of Security should be expanded to include two additional disinterested persons, chosen from DD/P and DD/I components.

13. The status of the Inspection Division should be changed from a division to a staff since it is not a line command function.

14. The Physical Security Branch should be made a division and five additional people be added to the T/O.

15. A new component should be created in the Special Security Division known as the Special Projects Branch, which would consolidate under one administrative head the Operations Support and Special Inquiry Desk, the Counter Intelligence Desk, and Labor Officer in the Operations Branch, and the Correspondents Section.

16. Consideration be given to classifying the position of Chief, [redacted] at the same grade in existence or recommended for the other Security Office Staff Chiefs.

17. The Security Office Career Service Board should select pertinent parts of its minutes for general dissemination to Headquarters Offices and should devise a method for developing with all personnel of the office long-range career plans including timing, training, rotation, and promotion.

18. A sterile Personnel Evaluation Report should be used by [redacted] This report should meet the standards required by Agency regulations and become a part of the permanent personnel record of Field people.

19. The Director of Security and other officials concerned should be commended on the soundness of the technical interview program.

20. Appropriate action should be taken on suggestions made in the discussion section of this report regarding certain personnel changes, administrative corrections and modifications in some operational practices which may be of benefit to the various supervisors and several of the Security office components.

SECRET

I. General

A. Organization and Responsibilities

1. The Survey of the Security Office (SO) will set forth in the section devoted to discussion a critical appraisal of the services rendered to the Agency by the Office. The report will not necessarily deal individually with each administrative component of SO, but will call attention to certain areas of activity which are being efficiently implemented, which need correction, and which require further planning and policy determination.

2. The Security Office comes under the general administrative supervision of the Deputy Director for Administration. (See Attachment A) It is a service Office and (1) develops, initiates, and establishes Agency policy relating to security matters; (2) prepares and executes the Agency's security programs; (3) plans and coordinates Agency emergency measures; (4) establishes precautionary measures to prevent penetration activities by non-authorized individuals; (5) approves or disapproves, from a security standpoint the employment or utilization of individuals by the Agency, (6) performs certain security inspection functions, and (7) provides trained security officers to other Agency components and overseas missions as required. (See Attachment B)

3. Viewing the achievements of the Security Office in general, this survey finds that it is effectively carrying out the Security programs and policies of the Agency. The Office is well administered and its discipline and morale are excellent. The Director of the Office is held in high esteem by his subordinates and his personnel have been well chosen.

4. The Office is organized functionally. The Director of Security is aided by a Deputy, an Executive Officer, four Staffs, and three Divisions. (See Attachment C) The four Staffs are: (1) Administration and Training; (2) Security Research; (3) Alien Affairs; and (4) Security Control. The three Divisions are (1) Special Security Division (SSD), (2) Security Division (SD), and (3) Inspection Division (ID). The authorized Table of Organi-

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5. The over-all budget of the Security Office shows a levelling off

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B. Efficacy of Security Regulations between 1946-1949

1. Prior to 1946 and subsequent thereto until 1949 there were no security regulations governing the use or employment of individuals in this Agency and its predecessors other than staff employees. The investigative staff during this period was used at the convenience and option of the

operating people. It was not used for covert clearance investigations whatsoever. Its main purpose was to do spot jobs principally for Agency supervisors. As a result there are people in covert assignments in the field at the present time who have not been properly investigated and cleared in accordance with present standards.

2. Before 1949 there were no acceptable definitions of a covert employee. If a person were hired on vouchered funds he was regarded as a staff employee. If he were hired on unvouchered funds, regardless of his duties, he was placed in the general category of "covert employee." The operational or foreign divisions in this period were not required to advise the Security Office of individuals employed in a covert capacity.

3. When in February 1949 the first regulations were issued which sought to apply some security rules relative to covert employees, it was believed that the Foreign Divisions should submit to the Security Office the names of all people used by them in a covert capacity so that they could be properly investigated. The Foreign Divisions, however, have been reluctant to submit the names of their covert operational employees and they have not been required to do so up to the present time. The use of anyone, either covertly or openly, concerning whom CIA does not have a full up-to-date dossier somewhere, either in the Security Office or in some Agency unit, is a security risk.

4. This survey shows the importance of the application of sound security measures which must be taken in all categories of clearances for the protection of the Agency and its operations. This holds true for such peripheral activities as Radio Free Europe, [redacted] and other operations of like character, which have [redacted] foreign ramifications. It is necessary, therefore, that careful checks and investigations be conducted on those persons who come into Agency operations at a time when policy was lacking, rules were lax, and regulations non-existent.

C. Agency Security Clearance Standards

1. CIA Regulation [redacted] "Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with CIA," and Executive Order 10450, "Security Requirements for Government Employment" establish the standards and procedures under which clearance is granted and continuing employment is authorized for staff employees of this Agency. (See Attachment B) There is no conflict of standards between these two directives. CIA Regulation [redacted] establishes three general prerequisites for employment: "(1) Of excellent character, citizens of the United States for at least five years, and who have no member of the immediate family or part of him subject to a foreign power and, (2) Whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned and, (3) Whose financial habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any improper influences." Executive Order 10450, in Section 3, specifically spells out disqualifying conditions or affiliations for employment, the majority of which pertain to (2) above. Expressed in current terminology, Section 3 of Executive Order 10450 establishes prohibitions against the employment of individuals in designated sensitive positions for reasons of both a security

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6. At the request of DD/P, some thought and research has been conducted by IAS on emergency destruction devices. Up to this time devices which personnel in the Security Office have inspected have been insufficient and inadequate.

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III. Security Division

A. Organization and Responsibilities

1. The Security Division is that unit considered responsible for the security and protection of departmental and official cover employees (staff employees only) and overt properties of this Agency. The titles of its three branches are indicative of the tasks performed by the Division. (See Attachment II) The Personnel Security Branch is responsible for establishing the scope of the investigation and for recommending clearances or disapprovals for all overt and semi-covert employees, consultants, classified contractors, overt operational contacts, and other categories of miscellaneous individuals. The Interrogation Research Branch is responsible for the conduct of the technical interview (polygraph) program. The Physical Security Branch is responsible for the protection of the physical and human assets of the Agency. In addition to these general responsibilities of a security nature, the Agency's Safety Officer and Safety Program are the responsibility of the Security Division.

2. To accomplish its assigned duties the Security Division has an

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is exercised over retention of cleared and desirable guards. It is rather incongruous that to protect one of the Government's most sensitive agencies we must depend on a guard force responsible to another agency, with full Civil Service job protection, and yet at 80% expense to CIA. The creation of an Agency guard or security protective force may present some administrative and legal problems. Such a solution appears warranted, however, in light of the goal to be obtained.

7. Apart from matters of physical security, this Agency is charged by law--Federal Employees Compensation Act of 1949 (PL 357 - 81st Congress)--and Executive Order 10694, "Establishing the Federal Safety Council" to develop, support, and foster an organized safety program. For some [redacted] employees housed in over [redacted] in the Washington Area, the Agency complies with this law and Executive Order by having one GS-11 Safety Officer, and one additional position for which recruitment is underway. While the Security Office has a Safety Officer, it does not have a sufficiently developed safety program. Such a program cannot be obtained until higher grades and additional positions are made available. In over [redacted] buildings exactly one scheduled fire drill took place


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security work, the Director of Security should undertake a study leading to a determination as to the most feasible method of centralizing responsibility for this function, and organizationally locating qualified personnel.

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5. Overseas inspection activities engaged in by SO are now limited to security investigations of such installations as [redacted] and [redacted] the Communications Installation [redacted] which was done in collaboration with the Inspection and Review Staff, DD/P.

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C. Projected Inspection Plans

1. During FY 1955 the Inspection Division plans to survey the Agency warehouses, printing and reproduction activities, external training programs, the [redacted] Offices, and the Eastern European and Far Eastern missions. There is no mention in this projected program of any surveys to be conducted in Headquarters buildings.

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
2. The overseas surveys listed in the schedule for inspection FY 1955 should be done only after coordination with the Inspector General. No inspection team should go to the field representing only the function of a specific office. To be done properly all phases of the activity of the field should be inspected concurrently as far as it is possible and problems studied so that a well-balanced report might be produced containing sound and practical recommendations for correction and improvement of field security matters and other activities. A Security Inspection Staff in SO has a part to play in this program.

June 1954

SECURITY OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET



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REGULATION

ORGANIZATION

5 April 1954

SECURITY OFFICE

9. MISSION

The Director of Security is charged with the preparation and execution of the Agency's security program, and with the performance of security inspection functions.

10. FUNCTIONS


The Director of Security shall:

- a. Recommend the establishment of Agency policies relating to security, and establish procedures for their implementation.
- b. Establish safeguards necessary to prevent penetration of Agency activities by unauthorized individuals; develop domestic counter-intelligence programs for the Agency.
- c. Obtain and evaluate through investigation and liaison contact pertinent information regarding personnel for employment, assignment, or association with the Agency. Approve or disapprove from a security standpoint the employment or utilization of individuals by the Agency.
- d. Determine the effectiveness with which security programs and policies are being accomplished.
- e. Coordinate and engage in policy and program planning of emergency measures.
- f. Prescribe security policies relating to the liaison and contact relations of Agency officials with others; establish and maintain necessary liaison with officials of other Government agencies on security matters.
- g. Investigate reports of violation or noncompliance with security policies or regulations and recommend or initiate appropriate action as may be required.
- h. Make necessary inspections, investigations, and reports to assure proper maintenance of security.
- i. Conduct certain activities pertaining to the overall program.
- j. Conduct research in security fields.
- k. Provide trained professional security officers as required to Agency missions and installations.

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Security Information

SECURITY OFFICE

June 1953



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SECRET

SECURITY DIVISION

CHIEF
DEPUTY CHIEF

PERSONNEL SECURITY BRANCH
CHIEF
ASSISTANT CHIEF

PHYSICAL SECURITY BRANCH
CHIEF
ASSISTANT CHIEF

INTERROGATION RESEARCH BRANCH
CHIEF
ASSISTANT CHIEF

CONTACT
OFFICER

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BUILDING BADGES & PASSES OUTSTANDING

Total Number of Regular Building Badges Outstanding, as of 15 June 1954 10,167

Number of Badges being held in Badge Office for personnel overseas (included in above total) 815

- a. Restricted Area #1
(For admittance to M & Q Center, mainly for OSI personnel) 896
- b. Restricted Area #2
(For admittance to M & Q Center, mainly for OSI and OSR personnel) 668
- c. Restricted Area #3
(For admittance to "I" Building OSI Restricted Area after 5:00 P.M.) 106

d.

e.

- f. Restricted Area #6
(Authorization for Security Office employees to request files from SO file room in "I" Building) 234

Total Number of Limited Passes Outstanding, as of 15 June 1954 347

- a. Contract Consultants 143
- b. Liaison from other agencies 162
- c. Couriers from other agencies 26
- d. Refreshment stands, personnel employed by the Washington Society for the Blind 16

WHAIS number represents the passes that were active as of 15 June 1954. All of these passes, and a very few of the liaison group, expired on 30 June 1954 and are presently being reissued for the new fiscal year. As the renewal process of these passes has not been completed to date it would be meaningless to give any figure of outstanding passes as of 30 June 1954.

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AGENCY UNCLASSIFIED TELEPHONES
as of 30 June 1954

Office																					Number of Telephones	
O/DCI	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
DD/P	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
IO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
EO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
CO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
DIR	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
CS	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
FO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
CGD	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
CGI	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
NO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
ORC	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
CGI	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Comp	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Total																						

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TELEPHONE CREDENTIALS OUTSTANDING

Exclusive of members of the CIA Security Patrol, there were telephone credentials outstanding as of 30 June 1954.

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CONTACT CREDENTIALS OUTSTANDING

There were 293 contact credentials outstanding as of 30 June 1954, broken down by Office as follows:

Office																					Number	
Auditor	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	<div></div>	
Comp	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Comp	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
DCI	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
DCI	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
DD/A	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
DD/I	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
DD/P	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
IO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
EO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
IO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
EO	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		

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Discussion

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